po liti cal consid era tions at work. Truman's de ci sion, stemming from a sum of con cerns, is left in somewhat tilted moral abeyance, as "proba bly unnec es sary." 7 That the major ity of diplo matic histo ri ans would go a long way toward explain ing patterns in the atomic bomb debate.
I hold a PhD in military history and have been a mem ber of the So ci ety of Mili tary History (SMH) for over a decade. Yet, I also would pre fer dip lo matic so lu tions, while spejoined the So ci ety of His tory of Ameri can For cial ists in the military more readily accept eign Re la tions (SHAFR) in 1986, when I opted mili tary options, should surprise no one.
for a mi nor in dip lo matic his tory. I have since More notewor thy are the inher ent histo ri ogat tended more than a dozen SMH and SHAFR raphi cal dif fer ences be tween both groups. An con fer ences and in the process have noticed analy sis of such differ ences, it would seem, sev eral differ ences in the perspec tives, ap-proaches, and styles of the two organi za tions and their constitu ents.
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I'll admit some tempta tion to dismiss the dis crep an cies as reflec tive of the politics of the present ers. Fifteen years of obser va tion
For those who fought World War II, the bombs served to end a cataclysmic struggle. For their descendants, however, the bomb brought forth fear of a new, more horrifying cataclysm.
lead me to conclude that military histo ri ans are, on av er age, more con ser va tive than most his to ri ans, most pro fes sors, and per haps even most Americans. By the same token, I am of the opinion that diplo matic histo ri ans, their lead er ship in par ticu lar, lean dis tinctly to the po liti cal left. Poli tics admit tedly influ ences one's perspec tive and in some cases may be all that really matters. No doubt some "histo ri ans" en ter the fray look ing for "evi dence" that can be made to fit their precon ceived conclu sions. Yet, the radical diver gences of the atomic bomb issue have deeper origins. Diplo matic his to ri ans and their mili tary coun ter parts not only arrive at dif fer ent con clu sions, they don't even ask the same ques tions. More of ten than not, even their intro duc tions scream diver gence.
Those who endorse Truman's deci sion usu ally begin with vivid descrip tions of the fight ing in the Pacific theater, climax ing with the whole sale slaughter of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Af ter they recount the feroc ity of these battles, the bombs follow logically as a reprieve from fur ther car nage prom ised by an am phibi ous in va sion of the Japanese home islands. 9 Dis sent ers, convinced that Japan was beaten and ready to surren der, rarely bother with descrip tions of island fighting. Instead, they routinely express revul sion at the car nage produced by the bombings themselves, at times presag ing their analysis with sympa thetic portraits of Japanese "victims." They in stinc tively express revul sion at the manner in which atomic weapons brought instant in cin era tion to many people and a slow, linger ing demise to many more. They further con demn the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki for being directed predomi nantly against non com bat ants. Overall, they express a fun da men tal sense of indig na tion that use of atomic bombs, regard less of specific rationale, was an ethical atrocity. 10 Moral attacks on the Hiroshima deci sion, how ever, seem to have less to do with the Pa cific war than with the dawn of the nuclear age. For many peo ple, to op pose the bomb ing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is to oppose nuclear weapons gener ally, and the possi bil ity of a third world war espe cially. A recent work la ments the "grave and little rec og nized costs of Hiroshima: nuclear entrap ment, moral in ver sion, national self-betrayal, endur ing patterns of se crecy, deep cul tural con fu sion, and the fear of fu ture less ness." 11 The chief op po si tion to Hiroshima, however, is the fear that such weapons might be used again: "As long as we continue to defend and justify the Hi roshima model, we risk making that kind of de ci sion again. . . . Our choice today is between perpetu at ing a mindset that allows another Hiroshima, or creat ing one that prevents that outcome and embraces human life." 12 Added to this is a genera tional divide: for those who fought World War II, the bombs served to end a cataclys mic struggle. For their descen dants, however, the bomb brought forth fear of a new, more horri fy ing cata clysm.
Mili tary and diplo matic histo ri ans reflect these genera tional differ ences. World War II has had a profound effect in shaping the atti tudes of the military history profes sion and re mains a very popular subject at SMH meet ings, as well as the subject of several special ized confer ences. More impor tantly, it forms a base and standard to which all ensu ing, and sev eral previ ous, conflicts are commonly com pared.
Fur ther more, to the people who fought it-and most of those who study it-World War II remains a "good war," in which the Al lied powers defeated two of the most ghastly re gimes of the modern era, or indeed all hu man history. The destruc tion of Nazi Germany and Impe rial Japan was without ques tion a consid er able achievement, and that achieve ment gave the combat ants-and most of those who write of them-a pervad ing moral recti tude that persists.
In telling contrast, the most numer ous ses sions at SHAFR confer ence, often com pris ing more than half the program, have dealt with the cold war. Many of the most popu lar of those sessions have dealt with Viet nam. Instead of a verita ble crusade as a base, diplo matic histo ri ans start with a war of dubi ous moral ity, wherein one encoun ters poli ti cians who rou tinely ig nore ad vice and data, to embark on campaigns devoid of strate gic logic, all in the name of false theo ries or saving face. The combat ants emerge with lit tle sense of ac com plish ment from a country that just didn't matter-and a war that never should have been fought. There should be little surprise that diplo matic histo ri ans approach their craft with in her ent doubt.
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Other cold war is sues en hance these sus pi cions. Central Intel li gence Agency activ ity in Cuba, Iran, Indo ne sia, and elsewhere, as well as ongo ing attempts to mask these actions, has spawned an in her ent dis trust of Wash ing ton within the SHAFR ranks. I sincerely be lieve that many diplo matic histo ri ans, rather like jour nal ists in the wake of Wa ter gate, now be lieve their pri mary task to be ex pos ing gov ern men tal lies. Given a standing assump tion that of fi cial ver sions of events are likely fab ri ca tions, it follows that diplo matic histo ri ans are naturally inclined to seek the "real rea son" for dropping the atomic bombs.
Not so long ago, I received a student exam which mistak enly placed the atomic bombs amidst the Vietnam ese conflict. Perhaps I should not have been so harsh in my criti cism, for the reading of certain revi sion ist schol ars could certainly lead the inex pe ri enced to that conclu sion. On a concep tual plane, if not a chronologi cal one, I would ar gue, the bombs are repeat edly dropped in Viet nam. By apply ing this framework to 1945, revi sion ists can conclude that argu ments about limit ing casual ties are mere cover, and the failure to employ alter nate meth ods must stem from ulte rior motives.
For some time, the most fashion able revi sion ist ex pla na tion for Tru man's de ci sion has Most diplomatic historians, rather like journalists in the wake of Watergate, now believe their primary task to be exposing governmental lies.
been that various offi cials desired to intimi date Joseph Stalin, perhaps even prevent ing him from secur ing terri to rial gains promised at Yalta. There is no hard evidence to in di cate that Truman, argua bly the most blunt and out spo ken man to occupy the Oval Office, ever regarded such diplo matic issues as paramount. To the revi sion ists, however, recurrent exam ples of anti-Soviet policy, coupled with asser tions that Truman and others rou tinely "doc tored" in va sion casu alty es ti mates in postwar justi fi ca tions for the bombings, 14 al low for in fer en tial ac cu sa tions that Tru man was ei ther of de vi ous mind him self or putty in the hands of his advi sors.
Mili tary histo ri ans do not deny that mem bers of Truman's staff assessed the im pact the bomb would have on the USSR. Such analysis would seem, after all, to fit their job descrip tions. But while some people perhaps concede that diplo matic concerns may have aug mented, sustained, or confirmed Truman's de ci sion, they do not accept the argu ment that the bombs were dropped primar ily to scare the USSR. Their willing ness to accept Tru man's justi fi ca tions may reflect a greater trust in na tional lead ers or their sense of overall Allied recti tude in the war. It may also re flect greater acknow ledge ment of Harry Tru man's own military history. Here was a man who had commanded troops in battle, in World War I, and knew the im por tance of sav- ing the lives of his men. 15 Now in command of the en tire Ameri can armed forces, it stands to reason that saving lives while ending the war on American terms would indeed be his high est prior ity.
Fur ther more, while diplo ma tists see the bombs as a radi cal de par ture, mili tary his to ri ans more readily place them within the context of strate gic precedents. Military histo ri ans acknowl edge that socie ties have at times im posed bans on weapons deemed unfair, un gen tle manly, too destruc tive, or oth er wise in ap pro pri ate. 16 Yet, they also recog nize that the atomic bomb did not have the symbolic weight in 1945 that it has taken on in five dec ades since. Those who judge Truman's de ci sion as intrin si cally evil are employ ing postwar standards.
Cu ri ously, another weapon did have a simi lar stigma in 1945: poi son gas. Al though Ameri can command ers at times consid ered the use of gas, for exam ple, in planning the in va sion of Iwo Jima, they jetti soned such proj ects. 17 Had the American leader ship been as mor ally bank rupt as some re vi sion ists por tray it, one wonders why gas was not used on the Japanese at some point.
Mili tary histo ri ans often debate the defini tion of "civil ian" as it relates to modern warfare. Some insist that all civil ians, regard less of how much they appear to support their gov ern ment, should be ab sent from tar get ing lists. Oth ers dis miss the whole is sue of "combat ant versus non com bat ant" as but a relic of pre in dus tri al ized warfare. Regard less, virtually all agree that such distinc tions became blurred rather early in World War II. Upon the accep tance that the war-making capa bili ties of so cie ties, not merely ar mies, were valid tar gets, there stemmed con sid era bly less aver sion to strategies and tactics that killed pri mar ily civil ians. When coupled with the mod ern state's reli ance on reserve forces-to in clude in desper ate times mili tia, home guards, and their ilk-the border distin guish ing military person nel from noncom bat ants be came even more hazy.
Although most military histo ri ans are will ing to allow for categori cal stands against stra te gic bomb ing on grounds of mo ral ity-or rela tive lack of military value, or both 18 -to con demn the atomic bombs alone without also criti ciz ing at tacks on Dres den, Ham burg, Cov en try, Rotter dam, Nanking, and so on, can be seen as selec tive, if not inap pro pri ate. From the stand point of com mand ers in 1945, the bomb was as much a continua tion of ex ist ing policy as devi ance from it. Those peo ple likely saw no seri ous differ ence between atomic in cin era tion and con ven tional satu ra tion bombing, such as the fantas tic destruc tion de liv ered upon To kyo in March. Mor ally speak ing, the key is sue was the de ci sion to de stroy cities, and that, right or wrong, had been made much earlier.
Re vi sion ists have identi fied several alter na tive strategies, suggested to Truman at some point, which they believe could have averted both the bombs and an in va sion of Ja pan. Naval command ers advo cated contin ued blockade, while their Army Air Corps coun ter parts favored sustained bombing. Nei ther was mutu ally exclu sive.
Mili tary histo ri ans see foibles in the alter na tive propos als. A blockade, for exam ple, might have taken months-or even years-to achieve the desired results. Further more, aside from pro hibi tive costs, logis ti cal challenges, and home-front impa tience, a blockade risked starv ing to death thousands of Japanese. Add ing contin ued conven tional bombing only height ens the poten tial carnage.
Be yond this, Al lied casu al ties would have con tinu ally mounted. At least 16 million peo ple had al ready died in the Pa cific war by the summer of 1945. Given that millions were still un der the yoke of Japa nese im pe ri al ism, thousands would have contin ued to die due to starva tion, disease, and mistreat ment. Among them were roughly hundreds of thou sands of Al lied pris on ers in Japa nese cap tiv ity.
Pol icy makers in 1945 under stood that, com pared to an inva sion, bombing and block ade promised lower imme di ate losses but provided no quick guaran tee of capitu la tion and hence no insur ance of long-term casu alty reduc tion. The bomb risked few Ameri can lives and seemed a boon to surren der. Thus, it seemed the best option to Tru man and his advi sors.
Dip lo matic histo ri ans have attempted to for tify their po si tion by un cov er ing lists of of fi cials who have expressed postwar doubts about the bomb's ne ces sity. Their lists of "no ta bles" include not merely a spate of scien tists, theo lo gi ans, poli ti cians, jour nal ists, and lite rati, whom military histo ri ans rather promptly dismiss as figures unlikely to fully grasp issues of strategy and tactics, but toplevel military leaders, such as Gen George Mar shall, Gen Douglas MacArthur, and Adm Ernest King. 19 These three names might seem im pres sive at first but upon close scrutiny seem unlikely to sway military experts. George Marshall was a man of great ad min is tra tive abil ity and a prin ci pal archi tect of the overall victory. Yet, was Mar shall a strategist upon whose cost/bene fits analysis of a poten tial inva sion of Japan one should weigh the deci sion to drop the atomic bomb? Is this not the same George Mar shall who advo cated a cross-channel attack into France in 1942-and again in 1943? Had Roose velt listened to Marshall in those cir cum stances, the American Army would likely have suffered catastrophic defeat.
MacAr thur's postwar opinions were likely skewed by his virtual assump tion of the emper or's author ity dur ing Japa nese re con struc tion. Aside from senti ments derived therefrom, one should not discount politi cal mo tives from a man whose posi tion on the bombs varied with time, and who made his op pos ing remarks at a point when he was con sid er ing a Repub li can run for the presi dency. Beyond that, MacArthur never ac quired a reputa tion as a "soldier's general." On the contrary, military histo ri ans, Austra lian ones in particu lar, have often charac ter ized MacArthur as self-absorbed and callous. That he was the strongest propo nent of an in va sion of the home islands in 1945, despite the fact that his casualty esti mates were among the highest offered to Truman, 20 speaks volumes about MacArthur but seems un likely to sway those who sup port the presi dent's deci sion.
In his memoir of 1952, King stated his belief that "had we been willing to wait, the ef fec tive na val block ade would, in the course of time, have starved the Japanese into submis sion." 21 Thus, King's views are predi cated on a highly debat able assump tion.
Of all the postwar services, the Air Force likely sported the most bomb naysayers. Sev eral Air Force command ers 22 echoed the asser tions of the United States Strate gic Bombing Sur vey, which, upon publi ca tion in 1946, boasted of inevi ta ble Japa nese sur ren der due to con ven tional bombing alone. Although a few mili tary histo ri ans find the survey convinc ing, oth ers dismiss it, along with King's similar claim, as so much service bra vado-of ten with post war budget ary concerns attached.
Most military histo ri ans remain unim pressed by lists of bomb detrac tors. Indeed, one sus pects that they could strengthen their own ar gu ments by com pil ing equally lengthy lists of those who did not express postwar doubts, in clud ing the en tire lead er ship of the United States Marine Corps, whose men would as sur edly have been at the fore front of any inva sion of Japan.
More impor tantly, while postwar skep tics are relatively common, those who expressed reser va tions before Hiroshima are few and far between. Despite consid er able ef fort, no one has yet discov ered any docu ments that demon strate a high-ranking mili tary offi cer's contem po rary oppo si tion to the bomb. 23 Very few had the oppor tu nity to voice any concerns. 24 When they did, the role they played was either suppor tive or ambigu ous. Marshall, for exam ple, not only supported the Hiroshima and Na gasaki strikes, he fa vored the use of as many as nine ad di tional bombs as prel ude to in va sion of the home is lands, should that still be nec es sary. An other common revi sion ist argu ment claims that if Tru man had adopted the rec ommen da tions of certain ad vi sors to mod ify the terms of uncon di tional surren der and guar an tee the emper or's reten tion, the war could have ended without inva sion or atomic attacks. The fact that certain Japanese civil ian poli ti cians favored peace in the summer of 1945, however, seems almost incon se quen tial, given a nation wherein the military had con sis tently imposed its will on civil ians since the in va sion of Man chu ria in 1931. The mili ta rists opposed capitu la tion, barring fur ther condi tions; these included selfdisarmament, self-prosecution of war crimi nals, and the reten tion of Korea, Formosa, and other parts of their empire. Most of the mili ta rists held to these views, unac cept able to all the Allied pow ers, even af ter Hi roshima and Nagasaki. 26 When one consid ers that three ci vil ian prime min is ters had been as sas si nated since the 1920s for op pos ing the mili tary's preroga tives, ascrib ing to the civil ian gov ern ment an abil ity to suc cess fully op pose the military seems wishful thinking at best.
Fur ther more, by 1945 the United States had little use for diplo macy vis-à-vis Japan.
Given memories of the fall of 1941, America was naturally and under standa bly suspi cious of further overtures and likely equated all "peace condi tions" with appease ment. Given these dy nam ics, nei ther the de tails of the pro pos als themselves nor the limited extent of sup port for them makes any real differ ence.
Fi nally, one should note that when Japan did of fer to sur ren der, its gov ern ment did so con di tion ally, pro vided that the em peror be re tained. The United States tacitly accepted this offer (with Hiro hito subject to Mac-Ar thur's direc tives) as relatively close to "un con di tional surren der," overrid ing the ar gu ments of some Allies, nota bly the Aus tra lians, who wanted to hang Hiro hito. Ja pan could have posed this offer before August. That it did not suggests that the status of the em peror was not the sole stum bling block to peace.
At the heart of this issue is the question of whether Ja pan really was will ing to sur ren der. With hindsight, the revi sion ists see an iso lated Japan pummeled from all sides, devoid of any real chance of "victory." By all logic, To kyo was beaten. Aircraft bombed the home land daily while warships shelled the coast at will. The Japanese faced chronic short ages in equipment, raw mate ri als, and food. Most impor tantly, they had no allies and were fighting the entire world by themselves.
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Yet, military history is full of exam ples of peo ple who seemingly should have surren dered but did not. Was there not, for ex am ple, a critical food shortage at Lenin grad? Did the be sieged surren der or fight on, with people dy ing of starva tion throughout the next nine hun dred days of battle? Eleventh-hour victo ries have been seized from the jaws of defeat. On some occa sions, miracles do occur, as with Freder ick the Great in the Seven Years' War. Given Japa nese ide ol ogy and his tory, es pe cially their "unde feated" record in warfare and my thol ogy of mira cle vic to ries, sur ren der was never certain, even upon the use of the atomic bombs.
Had the bombs not been used, there is some like li hood that an in va sion of the home is lands would have occurred. Both diplo-matic and mili tary his to ri ans have spent con sid er able time and effort in seeking casualty es ti mates for the proposed inva sion.
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All analysts agree, however, that Japanese casualties would have been extensive and in all likelihood greater than those suffered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.
sides are selec tive in the evidence they employ. The revi sion ists prefer prelimi nary Joint Chiefs of Staff studies, the postwar Stra te gic Bombing Survey, or recom men da tions of the invasion-optimistic Marshall. Other "smok ing guns" better feed the offi cial posi tion, such as the large stockpile of minted Pur ple Heart Medals or Medi cal Corps bloodrequirement esti mates, which antici pated casu al ties in the hundreds of thousands. It is curi ous that many diplo ma tists, who in other writings assume that documen ta tion has been destroyed, "doctored," gone missing, or was sim ply never re corded, are wed ded to hard evi dence throughout the atomic bomb debate. Does it not stand to rea son that Tru man would have inquired of his advi sors and command ers as to the ramifi ca tions of inva sion in infor mal set tings? Does it also not stand to rea son that he may have received equally infor mal answers such as a generic "thousands" or "lots" or "too many"? 3 0
Mili tary histo ri ans have attempted modern assess ments of what would have hap pened in a hypo theti cal inva sion of the Japa nese home islands. The extent of Japanese prepa ra tions, usually ignored by people who in sist that Tokyo was on the verge of surren der, serves as their chief source of "proof." Tra di tion ally, such assess ments have leaned to ward the high end in casu alty es ti mates, ar gu ing that the bombs prevented what would have been the largest opera tion of the war. Such cata strophic sce nar ios re main plau si ble, given the sheer numbers of Japanese regular forces and mili tia, kami kaze aircraft and boats, and the possi ble employ ment of gas and germ warfare. 31 Other re cent as sess ments are less pessi mis tic, seeing Japanese military power as nearly ex hausted, de pend ent on un tested forces, and vulner able to American coun ter mea sures.
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Proof as to poten tial casual ties is fleeting, as such would have depended primar ily on when, after the ini tial land ings, Ja pan sur ren dered. All analysts agree, however, that Japa nese casual ties would have been exten sive 3 3 and in all likeli hood greater than those suf fered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.
Dis agree ments surround ing poten tial casu al ties under score what is perhaps the most critical differ ence of perspec tive between diplo ma tists and military histo ri ans. Dip lo matic histo ri ans often ascribe relative value to Truman's deci sion. Implicit in their invasion-casualty argu ments, though rarely stated outright, is an effec tive equation of Japa nese lives with Ameri can ones. Fol low ing a compari son of actual casual ties at Hi roshima and Nagasaki with the lower projec tions for an inva sion comes the notion that kill ing 180,000 Japa nese for the sake of "only 30,000" Americans is not justi fi able.
Mili tary histo ri ans re spond that one of the pri mary duties of an offi cer, includ ing the com mander in chief, is to limit his or her own casu al ties. For Harry Truman to order the in cin era tion of thousands of Japanese for the sake of hundreds of thousands or "merely" tens of thousands of American or Allied lives-is not out of step with priori ties, duty, or ethos. Support for his deci sion thus remains steadfast, even if one accepts the mini mal invasion-casualty esti mates now pre ferred from Stanford to the Smithsonian.
Avoid ing unnec es sary enemy casual ties has long been part of modern "just war the ory," but such con cerns come into ef fect only af ter the enemy actu ally has surren dered or has clearly been defeated. Until that time, lim it ing enemy casual ties of neces sity remains a minor concern. Problems ad mit tedly arise in deter min ing when the enemy has been beaten. Given any indi ca tion of Japa nese deter mi na tion to fight, however, any com pe tent com mander would rightly take no chances. Is it not far better to sacri fice more en emy person nel than might actu ally be re quired, than in any way to risk the lives of one's own?
A few radical revi sion ists have argued that race hatred was the prime moti va tion for the atomic bombs. 34 Such accu sa tions seem to over look the anti-German background of the Man hat tan Project, 3 5 the exclu sion of Kyoto from target lists, and the benign occu pa tion pol icy that followed the war. Such charges seem all the more fraught when one consid ers that many Asians-particu larly Chinese, Ko re ans, Filipi nos, and Vietnam ese-were as en thu si as tic about Japan's defeat as any "white" conquer ors.
Ad mit tedly, though, in 1945 there was near-universal approval, naked joy, and per haps even mali cious delight that the Japa nese had gotten what they deserved. It may be impos si ble for people now to grasp the loath ing then held for the Japa nese. But as diplo matic histo ri ans have increas ingly voiced accu sa tions of racism, military histo ri ans seem more under stand ing of these emo tions, often tracing their origins to Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, or other exam ples of aggres sion and mistreat ment of captives.
More impor tantly, military histo ri ans more readily acknowl edge that within the con text of war, there has usually existed an in her ent loath ing for the en emy. When, af ter all, has any nation fought against a people it liked? Although enemies do not have to be "hated" per se, armies and socie ties com monly have toler ated or openly fostered the use of pejo ra tive terms and other methods of de hu mani za tion as one means of justi fi ca tion for kill ing. Such feel ings of ten ex ist even when the enemy is "just like us." Civil wars, af ter all, are commonly the most vicious and un re strained of con flicts. Per haps it is time to ques tion whether racism, which admit tedly flowed freely from both sides in the Pacific war, was the source of its brutal ity or just a read ily available conduit for hostil ity that would have existed anyway.
One hypo theti cal question may shed light on the entire issue: would there be so much flak about the atomic bombs if Lit tle Boy and Fat Man had been finished ear lier and landed some where in Germany?
By revisionist standards, was not the Battle of Berlin (which consumed several times more lives than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined) unnecessary and therefore condemnable? No respectable historian, regardless of subfield, is currently making such an argument.
If we apply the revi sion ists' standards to the Euro pean theater, their basis for critique seems even more power ful than it does in the Pacific. By any calcu la tion, Germany was a beaten na tion by the early spring of 1945. The German army faced short ages in all ar eas, while the Luft waffe had been so severely drained as to be in ca pa ble of mount ing ef fec tive op po si tion to the waves of Allied bombers which rained destruc tion daily and nightly upon a handful of par tially intact cities. While Hitler, much like his Japa nese counter parts, alter nated between fa nati cal resis tance and some form of mass sui cide, persons of power in Germany saw the hand writ ing on the wall and were frantic ally scram bling for a diplo matic solu tion-Al bert Speer for exam ple. The Allied high command ig nored Speer and the others. Few modern histo ri ans begrudge their deci sion.
In stead of pursu ing diplo macy, Russian forces entered Berlin, where they slaughtered hun dreds of thou sands of Ger man troops and ci vil ians, while los ing hun dreds of thou sands of their own. By re vi sion ist stan dards, was not the Battle of Berlin (which consumed several times more lives than Hiroshima and Na gasaki combined) unnec es sary and therefore con dem na ble?
No re spect able his to rian, re gard less of subfield, is currently making such an argu ment. Nor would such argu ments seem likely, even if an atomic bomb had added to the Euro pean 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998 car nage. Instead, I would argue, histo ri ans would un abash edly ex claim that if the bombs had saved but one vic tim from the Nazi death camps, their use was justi fied. Given the fail ures of appease ment, the knowledge of Nazi atroci ties, and a resolve to see the last twisted ves tiges of Prussian milita rism perma nently ex or cised, one hears remarka bly few com plaints on the finale of unconditionalsurrender pol icy in Europe. This is largely because knowledge of the Holocaust has fos tered an as so cia tion of the Na zis with un miti gated evil that is shared by all sane histo ri ans and renders would-be apologists impo tent.
Im pe rial Japan, however, is not always held in the same light. One can attrib ute this to a mul ti tude of fac tors, rang ing from dif fer ent victims, dispa rate organ iza tional struc tures, transla tion diffi cul ties, destruc tion of rec-ords, and postwar policy. Whether Japan and Ger many should be ef fec tively equated is an impor tant question, however, which af fects the probity of unconditional-surrender pol icy and Truman's deci sion. Mili tary his to ri ans do commonly make such an equation; their diplo matic counter parts do not.
Al though they never are Nazi apologists, many dip lo matic his to ri ans seem to re gard war as one big atrocity, from which differ en ti at ing among combat ants is an exer cise in biased judge ment. A few re vi sion ists even ex cuse Japa nese behav ior (e.g., their treatment of prison ers) as reflec tive of "cultural differ ences." 36 Most impor tantly, diplo matic histo ri ans com monly reject cita tions of Japanese atrocities in sup port of the atomic bomb ings as noth ing but a "two wrongs make a right" argu ment.
Mili tary his to ri ans see more logic in such a con ten tion. While revi sion ist works have mul ti plied, military histo ri ans, survi vors of the war, journal ists, and others have re sponded to portraits of Japanese "victims" with a plethora of books designed to show oth er wise. Works on Japanese chemical and bio logi cal warfare, 37 their treatment of pris on ers of war, 38 and their system of military pros ti tu tion 39 cer tainly challenge notions of the Japanese as inno cent dupes of American ra cism and im pe ri al ism. One might well con clude that logic, nego tia tion, and moral sua sion seemed outmatched oppo site those who were known to behead prison ers, eat their liv ers, and ad journ for a night of rap ing the lo cal slave-prostitutes. With the moral repug nance felt for Impe rial Japan comes an accep tance that in order to de feat a bru tal re gime, bru tal ity itself is often required. Whether to main tain the ethical high ground or to repay bad be hav ior with similarly harsh acts is a profound moral dilemma. Unfor tu nately, it is a fairly com mon one in war fare. Harry Tru man strug gled with this person ally. The day after Na gasaki, he lamented, "I can't bring myself to believe that, because they are beasts, we should ourselves act in the same manner." Yet, he went on to state, "When you have to deal with a beast, you have to treat him as a beast." 4 0 Viewed broadly, this seems less ra cism than a rational ac know ledge ment of the ene my's de ter mi na tion to re sist and a will ing ness to convince him other wise.
Mili tary his to ri ans do not read ily aban don the rules of war. But they do seem more likely to accept a "whatever it takes to get the boys home" stance when the enemy has proven him self anathema. Given that Japan commit ted atrocities that are readily compa ra ble to the war crimes of the Na zis, most mili tary histo ri ans can share with World War II vet er ans a feel ing of vin di ca tion. That sense of rec ti tude is enhanced by a strong desire to prevent any fur ther Allied casual ties and a belief that other options were unlikely to be less bloody in the long run. Given exten sive precedents and/or moral ambi gu ity regard ing the "civil ian" com po nent in the at tacks, they main tain sup port for Truman's deci sion.
As to which side is "right," I will concede lim ited room for debate, though I admit tedly lean toward the one that places the bombs in the context of the war in which they were dropped and take excep tion to "genera tional chau vin ism" (i.e., judging past events by con tem po rary standards). In varied analyses of the fail ure in Vietnam, military histo ri ans have noted that the appli ca tion of strate gic princi ples derived from World War II, within that in ap pro pri ate envi ron ment, either exacer bated or led directly to catas tro phe. 41 By the same to ken, should not histo ri ans beware those peo ple who seem to apply histo ri og raphic pa rame ters of the 1960s to strate gic deci sions of 1945?
A brief compari son can perhaps illus trate some dangers. Were not the North Vietnam ese to tally outclassed on paper? Were their casualties not totally dis pro por tion ate to those of the Ameri cans? Did they not endure blockades, short ages, and more "conven tional" bomb ton nage than all combat ants in World War II com bined? Did they sur ren der, or achieve their ob jec tives? Such analysis, if taken far enough, seems to prompt the question on why nuclear weap ons were not used in Vietnam. Such a prompt would repre sent the exact oppo site intent of revi sion ist argu ments.
Both military and diplo matic histo ri ans have made impor tant contri bu tions to the atomic bomb debate. If nothing else, their in ces sant analysis of Hiroshima and Na gasaki, as well as their graphic depic tions of the suffer ing therein, has helped to steer later genera tions away from the callous use of atomic weapons. Although many people are offended by those who challenge the va lid ity of Truman's deci sion, I prefer to see some thing inher ently humane in the work of those searching for nonatomic options. That the two groups differ so widely in con clu sions, however, no doubt stems from their mark edly di ver gent per spec tives of, ap proach to, and analysis of the issues. 8. Although I have attempted to substantiate the claims made in this article with written documentation, I willingly acknowledge that many of my opinions have been formed over time through observations made at SHAFR and SMH conferences. This includes information from actual conference sessions and question-and-answer sessions that follow, as well as attitudes displayed at dinners, in book exhibits, at receptions, and so on. Such perceptions have been elucidated in regular contacts with other members of the profession (letters, phone calls, etc.) and routine examinations of newsletters and journals. Furthermore, subscribing to Internet lists such as H-WAR, H-WWII, and H-DIPLO also gives one general impressions and hints as to historiographic patterns. What all this is leading to is that readers may find places in the article wherein generalizations are made without reference to specific written sources. In some cases, it is because I see the statement as blatantly obvious and unlikely to evoke criticism. In other cases, however, the above should explain the origins of my conclusions. Finally, I willingly allow for individual exceptions to the rather broad categorizations into which I place military and diplomatic historians. I stand by the general evaluations.
9. George Feifer, in Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Dropping of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992), makes this the crux of his argument. After noting that the
